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Abstracts 
 
Chapter I: Forest Devolution Reform in China: A Trigger for Investment or Deforestation?  
I investigate whether and how the devolution of forestland to households in China triggered investment in 
forestland, and its effect on forest resource conditions. The investment analysis is based on a panel dataset of a 
two-round survey of 3,000 households in eight provinces before and after the implementation of the forest 
devolution reform, while the analysis of resource conditions is based on satellite imagery on forest cover and 
vegetation during 2001-2012. Using a difference-in-difference propensity score matching model, I find that the 
devolution reform resulted in more investment, in terms of annual labor input days and value of silvicultural 
treatments per area unit. At the county level, more forestland devolved to household management is found to 
improve forest conditions during the time period studied. I also investigate the investment effect through two 
channels: (i) the effect of tenure security, i.e., holding a forestland certificate and (ii) the reallocation effect 
from obtaining more forestland resources. The effects of devolution and improved tenure on increased private 
investment and resource conditions provide evidence that well-defined and protected property rights for 
households offer an effective alternative to common-pool resources management in small-scale forestry in 
China. 
JEL Classification: O13, Q23, Q24, Q58 
Keywords: forest devolution; household management; forest investment; deforestation; China 
 
Chapter II: Allocative Efficiency or Agglomeration? The Emergence of Forestland Rental Markets and 
the Forest Devolution Reform in China  
This paper evaluates whether the devolution reform of forestland to household management had an effect on 
allocative efficiency and household welfare through participation in forestland rental markets. Using a 
household panel dataset from three Chinese provinces, I find that the emerging forestland rental markets 
improved allocative efficiency in terms of factor equalization. With the reform, forestland is transferred to 
forestland-constrained and labor-rich households, and to households with higher levels of productivity in 
forestry. I do not find any support for agglomeration of forestland to land-richer, wealthier, larger or powerful 
households. Participation in forestland rental markets increases household per-capita income and decreases the 
likelihood of having an income below the poverty line. 
JEL Classification: D61, O12, Q15, Q23  
Keywords: allocative efficiency, household welfare, forestland rental markets, collective forest tenure reform, 
China 
 
Chapter III: Managerial Incentives of Environmental Protection in Chinese-Style Federalism  
China's fast economic growth has come at the expense of environmental quality and the degradation of natural 
resources such as forests. In this paper, we identify career concerns by managers of state-owned enterprises that 
manage natural resources, and asymmetric information between managers and their superiors regarding the 
enterprises' environmental performance, as sources of environmental degradation. A manager of such an 
enterprise is the agent of two principals: national and sub-national governments. As well as needing to meet 
ecological targets imposed by the national government, a manager wants to be promoted into the ranks of the 
sub-national government. We develop three hypotheses based on a theoretical model with two principals and 
one agent. We then empirically test these hypotheses for the case of China's northeastern state-owned forests, 
combining satellite imagery data on deforestation with economic survey data. Our findings suggest that 
managers of state forests that have a larger area and volume, and are thus more difficult to monitor with respect 
to ecological targets, log more timber and are more likely to deforest. The same holds true for managers who 
share a larger percentage of profits with the local government. In turn, we find that sharing more revenue with 
the local government increases the likelihood of getting promoted. 
JEL Classification: H77, O13, O44, Q23, Q56 
Keywords: managerial incentives; environmental protection; deforestation; state-owned forests; state-owned 
enterprises; Chinese-style federalism; two-principal, one-agent model 
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